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Amelia Courtney Hritz***
INTRODUCTION
In Atkins v. Virginia,' the Supreme Court held that executing
individuals with intellectual disability violates the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment.2 Such
executions are inherently excessive primarily because individuals
with intellectual disability, as a class, do not have sufficient moral
culpability to make them deserving of the most serious punishment. 3
In reaffirming this decision in Hall v. Florida,4 the Supreme Court
noted that "to impose the harshest of punishments on an
intellectually disabled person violates his or her inherent dignity as
a human being."5
Atkins stressed that individuals with intellectual disability "have
diminished capacity to understand and process information, to
communicate, to abstract from mistakes and learn from experience,
to engage in logical reasoning, to control impulses, and to understand
the reactions of others."6 This, in turn, reduces the retributive and
James and Mark Flanagan Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. The authors wish to
thank Yangji Sherpa for her excellent research assistance. This essay is dedicated to the
memory of Eddie Elmore, who died on December 3, 2018. Eddie, a person with intellectual
disability, was released from prison in 2013 after serving thirty-two years in prison for a crime
he did not commit. He was a kind, gentle soul, who carried no grudges to his grave as a result
of his decades of wrongful imprisonment. He will be missed.
Samuel F. Leibowitz Professor of Trial Techniques, Cornell Law School.
** Robert B. Kent Public Interest Fellow, Cornell Law School.
1 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
2 See id. at 321 (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986)).
3 See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318.
4 Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701 (2014).
5 Id. at 708 (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317, 320).
6 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318, 320 ("[Their] diminished ability to ... process information, to learn
from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, or to control impulses . . . make[s] it less likely
that they can process the information of the possibility of execution as a penalty and, as a result,
control their conduct based upon that information.").
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deterrent purposes of capital punishment due to the fact that persons
with intellectual disability have significantly reduced moral
culpability due to their cognitive limitations and also makes it less
likely that they will be able "to make the calculated judgments that
are the premise for the deterrence rationale."7
The Court's judgment in Atkins was also informed by a concern
unrelated to culpability or deterrence: the heightened "risk of
wrongful execution" faced by persons with intellectual disability.8
Atkins listed multiple factors that increase the risk that an innocent
person with intellectual disability may be convicted: they are more
likely to confess falsely to a crime they did not commit; they often
have difficulty communicating favorable information to their
attorneys; they typically make poor witnesses (and thus rarely are
able to testify, or testify persuasively, in their own defense); and,
their demeanor can convey a false sense of lack of remorse. 9 The
Court concluded that these class characteristics reinforced its
determination that the death penalty is an excessive punishment for
persons with this profound disability.10
The Court's description in Atkins of the heightened risk of wrongful
conviction and execution facing persons with intellectual disability
struck us as right at the time it was made based on clients we had
represented wearing our litigation hats. In fact, as fate would have
it, at the time the Court decided to re-visit the categorical bar to
execution for persons with (then known as) mental retardation, two
of the authors were deep in pre-trial proceedings in the case of the
State (of South Carolina) v. Johnny Ringo Pearson." Based on our
investigation, we believed that our client-"Ringo to his family"-was
such a person. The state court stayed the proceedings pending the
United States Supreme Court's resolution of the Eighth Amendment
issue, and then, after the Court issued its decision in Atkins we
conducted one of the very first Atkins Hearings. 12 After multiple-days
of testimony, the judge determined that Ringo was a person with
intellectual disability and quashed the state's notice of intent to seek
the death penalty.13
But, for a variety of reasons, we were also convinced Ringo was
7 Hall, 572 U.S. at 709 (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319).
8 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
9 See id. at 320-21.
10 See id.
11 See John H. Blume, Intellectual Disability, Innocence, Race, and the Future of the
American Death Penalty, 42 HUM. RTS. 10, 11 (2016).
12 See id.
13 See id.
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innocent. His confessions matched neither the physical evidence nor
the prosecution's theory of the case, 14 a problem which surprisingly
did not seem to bother the prosecutors. Moreover, the other main
piece of evidence allegedly linking the murder to Ringo, who is
African American, was the testimony of two other persons initially
charged with the crime but then given immunity in exchange for their
testimony-both of whom were white. 15 Their statements were not
only inconsistent with Ringo's statements, but also struck us as
highly implausible, even ludicrous.1 6 Another piece of evidence the
prosecution intended to offer was a "duct tape expert", who was
prepared to testify that duct tape found on the victim's body
"matched" a roll of duct tape found in Ringo's car.1 7 Thus, in our view,
the prosecution's case rested on the "holy trinity" of false confessions,
snitches, and junk science, all fueled by some good old fashioned
Southern racism.
On the eve of trial, the prosecutors approached us with a "deal"
that was "too good to turn down" given the risk of a death sentence;
they offered to drop the murder charge if Ringo would plead guilty to
manslaughter, which, given the (extraordinary) length of his pre-trial
confinement, meant he was almost immediately eligible for release.18
We explained this to Ringo, and he entered an Alford plea to the
lesser included offense.19 Ringo was released many years ago and is
doing well, but his case is not the only one in which we have
represented an innocent, intellectually disabled defendant. 2 0
Our experience with several such defendants led us to ask how
frequent such cases are. This essay explores that question both
anecdotally and quantitatively, hoping to illuminate the causes of
wrongful conviction of persons with intellectual disability. We
14 See id.
15 See id.
16 See State v. Stuckey, 556 S.E.2d 403, 406-07, 408 (S.C. Ct. App. 2001).
17 See id. at 406.
18 See Blume, supra note 11, at 11. This is not an uncommon ploy by prosecutors and state
attorneys general in weak cases. See John H. Blume & Rebecca K. Helm, The Unexonerated:
Factually Innocent Defendants Who Plead Guilty, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 157, 158, 160-61, 180
n.144 (2014).
19 See Ian McGullam, Generations of Capital Punishment Clinic Students Fight for Johnny
Ringo Pearson, CORNELL L. SCH. (Oct. 16, 2013), https://www.lawschool.cornell.edulspotlights/
Generations-of-Capital-Punishment-Clinic-Students-Fight-for-Johnny-Ringo-Pearson.cfm. An
Alford plea is a form of guilty plea in which defendants maintain their innocence but agree that
there is enough evidence against them to convict. See Sydney Schneider, Comment, When
Innocent Defendants Falsely Confess: Analyzing the Ramifications of Entering Alford Pleas in
the Context of the Burgeoning Innocence Movement, 103 J. CRrM. L. & CR1MINOLOGY 279, 279(2013).
20 See, e.g., Blume, supra note 11, 11-12.
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provide examples from our experiences in the Cornell Death Penalty
Clinic and cases brought to our attention by defense attorneys.
21 We
also present data from the National Registry of Exonerations.
22 Then
we turn to the causes of the disproportionate wrongful conviction of
intellectually disabled persons and conclude by considering
implications of those causes for reform.
I. ESTIMATING THE NUMBER OF WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS OF
PEOPLE WITH INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY
In this essay we build on previous work highlighting the
heightened risk for individuals with intellectual disability to be
wrongfully convicted, particularly due to the risk of false confessions.
We have compiled a list of individuals that are likely to be people
with intellectual disability charged with crimes for which they are
innocent, drawing from multiple sources: The National Registry of
Exonerations, previous lists published by Robert Perske,
23 and
previous research on false confessions by Steven Drizin, Richard Leo,
and Richard Ofshe, 24 our own work, and communication with other
attorneys.
The National Registry of Exonerations (NRE) records detail
information about every known exoneration in the United States
since 1989.25 The NRE records include -one variable that tracks
whether there is evidence that the person has mental illness and/or
21 See app.
22 See generally, NAT'L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, http://www.law.umich.edulspeciallexonera
tion/Pages/about.aspx (last visited Feb. 23, 2019) ("The National Registry of Exonerations is a
project of the Newkirk Center for Science & Society at University of California Irvine, the
University of Michigan Law School and Michigan State University College of Law. It was
founded in 2012 in conjunction with the Center on Wrongful Convictions at Northwestern
University School of Law. The Registry provides detailed information about every known
exoneration in the United States since 1989-cases in which a person was wrongful convicted
of a crime and later cleared of all the charges based on new evidence of innocence.").
23 See Robert Perske, Perske's List: False Confessions from 75 Persons with Intellectual
Disability, 49 INTELL. & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 365 (2011) [hereinafter Perske, False
Confessions from 75 Persons]; Robert Perske, False Confessions from 53 Persons with
Intellectual Disabilities: The List Keeps Growing, 46 INTELL. & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES
468 (2008) [hereinafter Perske, False Confessions from 53 Persons].
24 See Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA
World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 971 n.453 (2004) (listing suspects with intellectual disability who
falsely confessed); Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, Consequences of False Confessions:
Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation,
88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429, 435-36 (1998) (describing probable false confessions,
including by people with intellectual disability).
25 See NAT'L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, supra note 22.
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intellectual disability. 2 6  As of February 2019, there are 146
individuals that fit into this category. 27 The authors reviewed case
information provided by the NRE and parsed out the intellectual
disability and mental illness variable. We identified 101 individuals
of the 146 where there was evidence of intellectual disability or
learning disabilities.28
The crimes for which people with intellectual disability have been
exonerated are concentrated among the worst crimes, as displayed in
Table 1. Most exonerees with intellectual disability are exonerated
for the crime of murder (69%), as is also true for anyone with mental
disability (66%), but as is not true for all exonerees (38% exonerated
for murder). 29
Table 1. Exonerations by Worst Crime
Total Any Mental Disability Intellectual Disability
SN= 2358 n = 146 n = 101
Murder 897 (38%) 97 (66%) 70 (69%)
Sexual Assault 303 (14%) 18 (12%) 12 (12%)
Child Sex Abuse 250 (11%) 15 (10%) 11 (11%)
All other cases 875 (62%) 16 (11%) 8 (8%)3o
Note: Data from National Registry of Exonerations. The intellectual disability variable was
created by the authors based on information from the NRE.
A charitable explanation is possible: in murder cases, the
importance of mitigating factors during sentencing makes it more
likely that intellectual disability will be investigated and uncovered
in those case.31 Given the limited information available about most
of the exonerations and the fact that the mental disability variable is
still being coded, we can't rule out this explanation. Another, less
benign explanation is that because there is so much more at stake in
investigations and prosecutions for murder than for lesser crimes,
authorities may put more pressure on defendants to confess to clear
26 See infra Table 1.
27 This variable is still being reviewed and more individuals may be added in the future.
28 See infra Table 1.
29 Id.
3o The remaining eight exonerees with intellectual disability were convicted of eight different
crimes. These crimes include: Robbery, Assault, Attempted Murder, Manslaughter, Weapon
Possession or Sale, Arson, Kidnapping, and Child Abuse.
31 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BEYOND REASON: THE DEATH PENALTY AND OFFENDERS WITH
MENTAL RETARDATION 5, 19 (2001).
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them.32 Relatedly, those higher stakes may cause greater reliance on
informants, or greater willingness to credit the stories of smarter
alternative suspects, techniques for which innocent individuals with
intellectual disability are particularly vulnerable. 33
Table 2. Exonerations by Sentence of People Convicted of Murder
Total Any Mental Disability Intellectual Disability
n = 897 n=97 n=70
Death 121 (13%) 26 (27%) 20 (29%)
Life Without Parole 120 (13%) 15 (15%) 13 (19%)
Life 250 (28%) 23 (24%) 15 (21%)
Term of Years 391 (44%) 33 (34%) 22 (31%)
Note: Data from National Registry of Exonerations. The intellectual disability variable was
created by the authors based on information from the NRE.
Among exonerees of murder, the more extreme the punishment,
the more likely we are to see an individual with'a mental disability,
including intellectual disability. 34 Overall, in 13% of exonerations for
murder, the individual was sentenced to death.35 When we focus on
individuals with mental disability and more specifically, intellectual
disability, there is a larger portion sentenced to death (27% and 29%,
respectively). 36
Table 3 displays the demographic data of exonerees. Exonerees
with intellectual disability are mostly male (93%), as are exonerees
generally (91% of all exonerees are male). Exonerees with
intellectual disability are somewhat more likely to be black (55%) 37
and juveniles at the time of the crime (25%), compared to exonerees
with no documented intellectual or mental disability (47% black and
32 See Drizin & Leo, supra note 24, at 946; Samuel R. Gross, The Risks of Death: Why
Erroneous Convictions Are Common in Capital Cases, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 469, 478, 481, 484-85
(1996).
- See Gross, supra note 32, at 481, infra Part II.D.
34 See supra Table 2.
35 Id.
36 Id. Six exonerated people were under 18 at the time of the crime and sentenced to death
(two of whom were people with intellectual disability). These convictions occurred before the
Supreme Court's decision in Roper v. Simmons, which found the practice to be unconstitutional.
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005). If we exclude all people under 18 at the time of
the crime, the percentage of murderers who were sentenced to death is 15% (all), 31% (mental
disability), 31% (intellectual disability). See infra Table 3 for counts of people under 18.
3 See infra Table 3.
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8% under 18).38 This raises the possibility that the combination of
race, youth, and intellectual disability may further increase the
vulnerability to wrongful conviction.39
Table 3. Demographic Information of Exonerations
Total Any Mental Disability Intellectual Disability
N= 2358 n = 146 n = 101
Under 18 209 (9%) 31 (21%) 25 (25%)
Male 2145 (91%) 133 (91%) 94 (93%)
White 903 (38%) 63 (43%) 36 (36%)
Black 1120 (47%) 71 (49%) 56 (55%)
Hispanic 280 (12%) 11 (8%) 9 (9%)
Other 55 (2%) 1 (1%) 0 (0%)
Note: Data from National Registry of Exonerations. The intellectual disability variable was
created by the authors based on information from the NRE.
The NRE data is under-inclusive because it does not include
individuals, like Johnny Ringo Pearson, who presented a strong
showing of innocence, but were not officially exonerated. 40 Data from
research by Steven Drizin, Richard Leo, and Richard Ofshe reveals
some of them. Leo and Ofshe described sixty cases where an
individual was arrested primarily because of a confession that later
was proven, or highly likely, to be false. Many of these individuals
were never formally exonerated and therefore were not included in
the NRE database.41 While Leo and Ofshe did not discuss intellectual
disability specifically, it was mentioned in the descriptions of fifteen
cases. 42 Six of these cases were not in the NRE database. Drizin and
Leo focused on innocent defendants who had falsely confessed as
8 See id.; NRE database (on file with authors).
3 See Barry C. Feld, Police Interrogation of Juveniles: An Empirical Study of Policy and
Practice, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 219, 308 (2006) ("[P]rolonged interrogation-especially
in conjunction with youthfulness, mental retardation, or other psychological vulnerabilities-
is strongly associated with eliciting false confessions.").
40 See NAT'L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS, supra note 22; Glossary, NAT'L REGISTRY
EXONERATIONS, https://www.law.umich.edu/speciallexoneration/Pages/glossary.aspx (last
visited Apr. 13, 2019).
41 See Leo & Ofshe, supra note 24, at 435-36.
42 Id. at 459-60, 461-62, 465-66, 466-67, 468-69 479-80, 481, 485, 487, 490 (identifying
Richard LaPointe, Jessie Misskelley, Jr., Douglas Warney, Barry Lee Fairchild, Delbert Ward,
Jack Carmen, David Vasquez, Johnny Lee Wilson, William Kelley, Christopher Smith, Ralph
Jacobs, John Purvis, Melvin Lee Reynolds, Earl Washington, and Juan Rivera as people with
intellectual disability (or "mentally handicapped")).
1038 Albany Law Review [Vol. 82.3
demonstrated by at least one piece of dispositive evidence; they found
125 such individuals, including many not formally exonerated.
43
Drizin and Leo identified 28 of these individuals as people with
intellectual disability.44 Nineteen were not in the NRE database.
Robert Perske built on the research of Drizin and Leo, identifying
additional cases of individuals with intellectual disability who had
confessed to crimes and were later proven to be innocent.4
5 He
published a list of 75 exonerated individuals with intellectual
disability. 46 This included an additional 28 people who were not
included in the previous research or the NRE database. Taken
together, these articles identify 53 individuals not included in the
NRE database who are likely to be people with intellectual disability
who were convicted of serious felonies that they did not commit. Our
communication with defense attorneys revealed an additional 18
people with evidence of intellectual disability and innocence.
4 7
In total, we have identified 172 individuals with documented
claims of intellectual disability and innocence. This is almost
certainly an underestimate because individuals with intellectual
disability often go to great lengths to conceal their disability, hiding
behind a "cloak of competence."48 The cloak of competence can make
" See Drizin & Leo, supra note 24, at 924-25, 951.
44 Id. at 971 n.453 (listing Medell Banks, Victoria Banks, Leonard Barco, Corey Beale,
Corethian Bell, Melvin Bennett, Keith Brown, Rodney Brown, Timothy Brown, Allen Chesnut,
Antwon Coleman, Ricky Cullipher, Gerald Delay, Michael Fitzpatrick, Michael Gayles, Hubert
Geralds, Anthony Gray, Paula Gray, Charles King, Johnny Massingale, Calvin Ollins, Don
Olmetti, Ronald Paccagnella, Patrick Smith, Jerry Frank Townsend, Dianne Tucker, Robert
Wilkinson, and Fred Williams as people with intellectual disability). None of these people were
included in Leo and Ofshe's list. See supra note 42.
45 See Perske, False Confessions from 53 Persons, supra note 23, at 468.
46 Perske, False Confessions from 53 Persons, supra note 23, at 468 (listing Eunice Baker,
Floyd Lee Brown, Ozem Goldwire, Robert Gonzales, Ladell Hughes, Harold Israel, Terric
Jeffrey, Matthew Livers, Godfrey Miller, Brian Oltmanns, Roberto Rocha, Donald Shoup, and
Charles Singletary); Perske, False Confessions from 75 Persons, supra note 23, at 365 (adding
to the list of 53 and including Joseph Arridy, Jesse Barnes, Jerome Bowden, Earl Correll,
Anthony Dansberry, Girvies Davis, Eddie Elmore, Charles Hickman, Tommy Lee Hines,
Lebrew Jones, Tyler Sanchez, Antonio Santiago, Cornelius Singleton, James Thompson, Jr.,
and Lourdes Torres).
47 See app. (describing cases identified by attorneys). We included cases where (1) there is
documented evidence consistent with intellectual disability (e.g. IQ scores below 70 and deficits
in adaptive functioning) even if the court did not find that the person has intellectual disability
and (2) there is evidence in support of innocence or evidence discrediting the State's main
evidence of guilt. See, e.g., Leo & Ofshe, supra note 24, at 435-36 (including cases where
innocence was "proven," "highly probable," and "probable"). There were additional cases of
individuals with intellectual disability who maintained their innocence but were found guilty
largely based on confessions they made in response to suggestive police interrogations. While
there is reason to doubt these confessions, see infra section IIA, we did not include these cases
on our list unless there is additional evidence disputing their confessions.
4 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 31, at 12. ("Since mentally retarded people are
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it very difficult for their lawyers to identify the intellectual disability,
especially if the individual is in the mild range. 49 It has been our
experience, which we have detailed elsewhere, that limited resources
and expertise lead lawyers-even experienced capital defense
lawyers-to miss red flags of intellectual disability and thus fail to
raise the issue at trial or in state and federal post-conviction
appeals.50 It can take years for the facts of intellectual disability to
be uncovered.5 1 Of the NRE exoneree list of 2,212 individuals with
no established mental disability, we are confident there are many
who in fact are people with intellectual disability. 52
In the remaining sections, we will present our analysis of the
NRE's detailed data to explore the various factors contributing to the
wrongful convictions. We will also provide case examples from the
additional cases we identified through our supplemental inquiries to
practitioners.
II. CAUSES OF WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS
Certain deficits that are common in people with intellectual
disability can exacerbate the risk of wrongful conviction. In this
section, we briefly describe the clinical definition of intellectual
disability and the deficits that correlate with some causes of wrongful
conviction.
Intellectual disability involves substantial limitations in present
functioning characterized by three prongs: deficits in intellectual
functioning and adaptive functioning, and manifestation of these
deficits in childhood. 53 Intellectual functioning, the first prong of the
often ashamed of their own retardation, they may go to great lengths to hide their retardation,
fooling those with no expertise in the subject. They may wrap themselves in a 'cloak of
competence,' hiding their disability even from those who want to help them, including their
lawyers. Overworked or incompetent lawyers may overlook evidence of retardation and fail to
request a psychological evaluation or raise the issue during trial. At times, even competent
lawyers who are anxious to help their clients may fail to identify their clients' retardation or
may be unable to access funds for a psychological evaluation.").
4 See infra notes 53-56 and accompanying text for a discussion of mild intellectual
disability.
5 See Sheri Lynn Johnson et al., Protecting People with Intellectual Disability from
Wrongful Execution: Guidelines for Competent Representation, 46 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1107, 1107,
1109, 1113-17 (2018); see also Blume, supra note 11, at 12 (discussing how the needed expertise
and funding is substantially higher when a client has an intellectual disability).
51 See Blume, supra note 11, at 13.
52 See supra Table 1.
53 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 308 n.3 (2002); AM. ASS'N INTELLECTUAL &
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND
SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS (11th ed. 2010) [hereinafter AAIDD] ("Intellectual disability is a
disability characterized by significant limitations in both intellectual functioning and
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clinical definition, is largely based on IQ scores. 54  Adaptive
functioning, the second prong, measures the ways in which the
intellectual deficits affect the individual's ability to function in life.55
This portion of the definition requires that an individual's diminished
intellectual functioning involves actual impairment in the skills
involved in everyday living.56
Approximately 75% of people with intellectual disability fall within
the mild range, generally defined by an I.Q. score between 55 and
75.57 Criminal defendants are more likely to have mild intellectual
disability than moderate or severe because persons who are more
impaired are rarely subject to criminal proceeding: they are not
likely to commit crimes due to the nature of their disability, and, if
they do, they are more likely to be found not competent to stand trial,
or to lack criminal responsibility.5 8
Mild intellectual disability is easy to overlook or misunderstand
because of its lack of a specified etiology and the likelihood that
individuals in this category often will not meet preconceived notions
of intellectual disability.59  Individuals with mild intellectual
disability often do not have identifiable characteristics that the
public may associate with the disability and they are likely to have
in adaptive behavior, which covers many everyday social and practical skills. This disability
originates before the age of 18."); see also AM. PSYCHIATRIC AsS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 33 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-5] ("Intellectual
disability . . . is a disorder with onset during the developmental period that includes both
intellectual and adaptive functioning deficits in conceptual, social, and practical domains.")
Johnson et al., supra note 50, at 1110 (explaining that intellectual disability has three main
criteria for diagnosis.).
54 See John H. Blume et al., The American Experience with the, Categorical Ban Against
Executing the Intellectually Disabled: New Frontiers and Unresolved Questions, in VAGUENESS
IN PSYCHIATRY 222, 224--25 (Geert Keil et al. eds., 2017); NAT'L ACAD. OF SCI., ENGINEERING &
MED., MENTAL DISORDERS AND DISABILITIES AMONG Low-INCOME CHILDREN 169-70 (Thomas
F. Boat & Joel T. Wu eds., 2015).
55 See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3 (discussing adaptive functioning as deficiencies in
everyday skills); see also Johnson et al., supra note 50, at 1110 (discussing the three prongs of
intellectual disability diagnosing criteria).
56 DSM-5, supra note 53, at 33; AAIDD, supra note 53.
57 See MARC J. TASSt & JOHN H. BLUME, INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY AND THE DEATH
PENALTY: CURRENT ISSUES AND CONTROVERSIES 102 (2018); NAT'LACAD. OF SCI., ENGINEERING
& MED., supra note 54, at 171 tbl.9-1.
58 See TASSt & BLUME, supra note 57, at 10; Frank M. Gresham, Interpretation of
Intelligence Test Scores in Atkins Cases: Conceptual and Psychometric Issues, 16 APPLIED
NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 91, 92 (2009); J. Gregory Olley, Knowledge and Experience Required for
Experts in Atkins Cases, 16 APPLIED NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 135, 136 (2009); Octavia Gory, Note,
Safeguarding the Constitutional Rights of the Intellectually Disabled: Requiring Courts to
Apply Criteria That Do Not Deviate from the Current Edition of the DSM, 24 WIDENER L. REV.
155; 161 (2018).
59 See Gresham, supra note 58, at 92.
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some skills that appear to be above the cutoff for the diagnosis.60
Although every person with an intellectual disability will lack some
basic skills and abilities that nondisabled individuals typically
possess, not every individual with an intellectual disability will be
limited in the same way.61 A fundamental precept of the field of
intellectual disability is that "[w]ithin an individual, limitations often
coexist with strengths."62 Because the mixture of skills and skill
deficits varies widely among persons with an intellectual disability,
there is no clinically accepted list of common, ordinary skills or
abilities that preclude a diagnosis of intellectual disability.63
Common deficits, such as substantial limitations in social skills, 64
working memory,65 and managing stress6 6 can cause different
vulnerabilities within the criminal justice system.67 Deficits in social
skills affect interactions with police during interrogations,
relationships with the defense team, and presentation of self to the
jury during trial.68 Deficits in working memory can impair an,
60 See Olley, supra note 58, at 136-37.
ex See Frequently Asked Question on Intellectual Disability, AM. Ass'N INTELL. &
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES, https://aaidd.org/intellectual-disability/definition/faqs-on-intel
lectual-disability (last visited Apr. 13, 2019).
62 See Introduction to Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities, ARC (Aug. 2009),
http://www.thearcjackson.org/Introductiontoidd8-11.pdf (citing to the language of the AAIDD
to define intellectual disability).
6 See Olley, supra note 58, at 137; see also NAT'LACAD. OF SCI., ENGINEERING & MED., supra
note 54, at 170 (discussing that people can be diagnosed as intellectually disabled, even if they
do exhibit everyday skills).
6 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 31, at 14 ("[Pleople with mental retardation often
miss social 'cues' that other adults understand. Their inappropriate social responses can be'
misinterpreted by people who do not know they have mental retardation or who do not
understand the nature of retardation. They may act in ways that seem suspicious, even when
they have done nothing wrong. When questioned by police or other authority figures, they often
smile inappropriately, fail to remain still when ordered to do so, or act agitated and furtive
when they should be calm and polite. Others may fall asleep at the wrong moment.").
66 See Nigel Beail, Interrogative Suggestibility, Memory and Intellectual Disability, 15 J.
APPLIED RES. INTELL. DISABILITIES 129, 131 (2002); Gisli H. Gudjonsson & Lucy Henry, Child
and Adult Witnesses with Intellectual Disability: The Importance of Suggestibility, 8 LEGAL &
CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 241, 243 (2003); see also Kristen Schuchardt et al., Working
Memory Functions in Children with Different Degrees of Intellectual Disability, 54 J. INTELL.
DISABILITY RES. 346, 348 (2010) (explaining a study developed to identify specific memory
deficits in intellectual disability children).
66 See Gudjonsson & Henry, supra note 65, at 243; see also Haleigh M. Scott & Susan M.
Havercamp, Mental Health for People with Intellectual Disability: The Impact of Stress and
Social Support, 119 AM. J. INTELL. & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 552, 552 (2014)("[I]ndividuals with [intellectual disability] may be at greater risk for experiencing stress than
their counterparts without a disability .... .").
67 See Jane A. McGillivray & Barry Waterman, Knowledge and Attitudes of Lawyers
Regarding Offenders with Intellectual Disability, 10 PSYCHIATRY PSYCHOL. & L. 244, 244
(2003).
68 AAIDD, supra note 53 ("[Plarticularly relevant for criminal defendants are deficits in
adaptive behavior, which can include social skills such as interpersonal skills, gullibility,
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innocent person's ability to resist police pressure to confess during an
interrogation, assist counsel, and testify in their own defense.
6 9
Difficulties managing stress and coping to unfamiliar demands can
make them vulnerable during police interrogations, make them poor
witnesses at trial, and may lead them to act inappropriately during
trial. 70
We now turn to how those characteristics produce wrongful
convictions. Here we elaborate on our earlier work, 71 considering
additional data from the NRE database and examples from our own
data.
A. False Confessions
The best-documented cause of wrongful conviction among people
with intellectual disability is false confessions. 72 This is also the first
cause of wrongful conviction discussed in Atkins v. Virginia.
73 As
displayed in Table 3, individuals with mental disability, and more
specifically, intellectual disability, are wildly overrepresented among
naivete, social problem solving, and the ability to follow rules."); Gudjonsson & Henry, supra
note 65, at 247 ("[Ijnterestingly, even though the mermory scores of the children and adults on
the GSS 2 were consistently low, the suggestibility scores had a much greater range,
highlighting the enormous individual differences in suggestibility among the moderately
intellectually disabled."); McGillivray & Waterman, supra note 67, at 244-45.
69 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320-21 (2002); Gudjonsson & Henry, supra note 65,
at 243; McGillivray & Waterman, supra note 67, at 245.
7o See Gudjonsson & Henry, supra note 65, at 249 ("There is no doubt that the stress and
demands associated with testifying in court, whether as a witness, victim, or suspect, can
undermine the potential value of the testimony and the credibility of the witness.. .. The
problems . . . relate to lawyers' use of complicated language, which often confuses witnesses,
heavy reliance on closed and leading questions, and focusing unduly on peripheral information
that witnesses have difficulties in remembering. The consequences of using these tactics when
cross-examining witnesses are likely to be particularly serious when applied to people with
learning disabilities, because of their specific vulnerabilities relating to poor vocabulary and
memory capacity, as well as heightened suggestibility and acquiescence during questioning.");
see also McGillivary & Waterman, supra note 67, at 245 (explaining that people with
intellectual disability may be more anxious and confused by an interrogation process and will
then confess to a crime they did not commit).
71 See John H. Blume et al., Convicting Lennie: Mental Retardation, Wrongful Convictions,
and the Right to a Fair Trial, 56 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 943, 951-58 (2012).
72 See Drizin & Leo, supra note 24, at 969, 971-72 (finding 28 of their 125 false confessions
were stated by people with intellectual disability, including the case of Michael Gayles: an
eighteen year old with an IQ of seventy-one and a learning disability); Samuel R. Gross et al.,
Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through 2003, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 545
(2005) (showing that 69% of persons exonerated by DNA who had mental disabilities were
wrongfully convicted because of false confessions); Perske, False Confessions from 75 Persons,
supra note 23, at 365; Samson J. Schatz, Note, Interrogated with Intellectual Disabilities: The
Risks of False Confession, 70 STAN. L. REV. 643, 645 (2018).
73 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320-21 (2002).
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exonerated people who have falsely confessed.7 4 While only 12% of
the entire sample of exonerees falsely confessed, 71% of the exonerees
with intellectual disability confessed.7 5 (Put another way, 25% of the
exonerees who falsely confessed had intellectual disability, a finding
which is consistent with previous research.76) This risk seems
particularly great among the young: of the twenty-five exonerated
juveniles with intellectual disability, twenty-one (84%) confessed.7 7
Notably, individuals with intellectual disability are not significantly
overrepresented among causes of wrongful conviction that are
unconnected to intellectual disability such as mistaken eyewitness
identification and faulty forensic evidence.7 8
Table 4. Exonerations by Contributing Factor
Total Any Mental Disability Intellectual Disability
N= 2358 n= 146 n= 101
False Confession 287 (12%) 101 (69%) 72 (71%)
Mistaken Witness
Identification 671 (28%) 29 (20%) 21 (21%)
Faulty Forensic Evidence 551 (23%) 33 (23%) 20 (20%)
Note: Data from National Registry of Exonerations. The intellectual disability variable was
created by the authors based on information from the NRE.
Other empirical studies also find an increased risk of false
confessions among individuals with intellectual disability,7 9
especially juveniles with intellectual disability.80  Two factors
contributing to this increased risk of false confession are increased
susceptibility to police interrogation tactics and decreased
74 See supra Table 3.
75 See infra Table 4.
76 See id.; Drizin & Leo, supra note 24, at 971, 973.
n See supra Table 3; NRE database (on file with authors).
78 See infra Table 4.
7 See Gudjonsson & Henry, supra note 65, at 241 ("Children and adults with learning
disability have much poorer memory and higher suggestibility scores than their contemporaries
of normal intelligence. Differences in suggestibility are only partly explained by poorer memory
scores. The findings reveal important differences between children and adults with intellectual
disabilities. Children with learning disabilities are more susceptible to altering their answers
under pressure than are adults with learning disabilities.").
8 See Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and
Recommendations, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 3, 19 (2010); Blakely Lloyd, Note, Making an
Involuntary Confession: An Analysis of Improper Interrogation Tactics Used on Intellectually
Impaired Individuals and Their Role in Obtaining Involuntary Confessions, 42 LAW &
PSYCHOL. Rev. 117, 127 (2018).
understanding of the Miranda warnings.81  The potential
psychological coerciveness of police interrogations has concerned
courts for nearly a century, but the measures designed to protect
individual rights-in particular, Miranda warnings-are not
designed for people with diminished cognitive functioning.8 2
Police interrogations are designed to persuade a suspect to confess
by "manipulat[ing] the individual's analysis of his immediate
situation and his perceptions of both the choices available to him, and
of the consequences of each possible course of action."8 3 Individuals
with deficits in managing stress and decreased social skills can be
particularly susceptible to social pressure and more likely to
acquiesce to interrogators' demands, which produces statements that
are consistent with the interrogators' beliefs rather than the
suspects' memories. 84 Difficulties managing stress may increase the
likelihood that innocent victims may succumb to social pressure
during interrogation, if only to end the prolonged interrogation.85
Interrogators, who often have already concluded that the suspect
is guilty, 86 alert the suspect to their beliefs by repeating specific
information and selectively reinforcing the suspect's statements.87
Police may even lie about the existence of persuasive evidence
against the suspect in order to persuade the suspect that there is no
way out.88 Police can convince suspects that confessing will improve
their situation by threatening them with punishment if they do not
confess or promising them rewards if they do confess.89 These types
81 See Lloyd, supra note 80, at 127-28.
82 See id.; Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 455 (1966) ("[T]he very fact of custodial
interrogation exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the weakness of
individuals.").
83 Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, Coerced Confessions: The Decision to Confess Falsely:
Rational Choice and Irrational Action, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 979, 985 (1997).
84 See Miriam S. Gohara, A Lie for a Lie: False Confessions and the Case for Reconsidering
the Legality of Deceptive Interrogation Techniques, 33 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 791, 824 (2006); Saul
M. Kassin & Katherine L. Kiechel, The Social Psychology of False Confessions: Compliance,
Internalization, and Confabulation, 7 PSYCHOL. SCI. 125, 127 (1996).
85 See Kassin et al., supra note 80, at 14.
86 See Saul M. Kassin, A Critical Appraisal of Modern Police Interrogations, in
INVESTIGATIVE INTERVIEWING: RIGHTS, RESEARCH AND REGULATION 207, 214 (Tom Williamson
ed., 2006); see also FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 78 (4th
ed. 2001) ("The successful interrogator must possess a great deal of inner confidence in [their]
ability to detect truth or deception, elicit confessions from the guilty, and stand behind decisions
of truthfulness.").
87 See Kassin, supra note 86, at 223.
88 See Robert Perske, Deception in the Interrogation Room: Sometimes Tragic for Persons
with Mental Retardation and Other Developmental Disabilities, 38 MENTAL RETARDATION 532,
534 (2000) [hereinafter Perske, Deception in the Interrogation Room]; Christopher Slobogin,
Deceit, Pretext, and Trickery: Investigative Lies by the Police, 76 OR. L. REV. 775, 786 (1997).
89 See Richard A. Leo, Criminal Law: Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
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of techniques are particularly persuasive for individuals with
reduced working memory capacity (which leads to increased
uncertainty about their memories) and heightened trust of
authority.90
Police interrogation techniques may also affect cognition by
convincing people with poor memory that they are guilty even though
they have no memory of committing the crimes in question. 91 Police
often encourage this belief by telling suspects they may have
repressed their memories of the crime.92 Suspects who already
distrust their memory-a trait often possessed by persons with
intellectual disability because their memories are in fact
undependable-may come to believe that they may have committed
the crimes despite no actual memory of having done so.93
Individuals with intellectual disability frequently have difficulty
understanding abstract concepts, including their legal rights and the
Miranda warnings. 94 Studies measuring comprehension of Miranda
warnings consistently find that individuals with intellectual
disability have deficient understanding of those warnings.95
Individuals with intellectual disability are also less likely to seek
assistance of family or friends during interrogations, often because
they do not know how to reach them.96
The vulnerability of people with intellectual disability to repeated
police interrogations is exemplified by the experience of one of our
clinic clients, Kenneth Simmons, who was convicted and sentenced to
death in connection with the rape and murder of eighty-seven year
old Lily Bell Boyd.97 At trial the prosecution relied on two categories
CRIMINOLOGY 266, 278-79 (1996) ("If a portrait of the typical interrogation emerges from the
data, it involves a two-prong approach: the use of negative incentives (tactics that suggest the
suspect should confess because of no other plausible course of action) and positive incentives(tactics that suggest the suspect will in some way feel better or benefit if he confesses).").
9 See Richard A. Leo, False Confessions: Causes, Consequences, and Implications, 37 J. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 332, 335-36 (2009); Perske, Deception in the Interrogation Room, supra
note 88, at 532.
91 See Amelia Courtney Hritz, Note, "Voluntariness with a Vengeance"- The Coerciveness of
Police Lies in Interrogations, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 487, 506 (2017).
92 See id. at 505-06; Ofshe & Leo, supra note 83, at 1000.
93 See Kassin et al., supra note 80, at 15 (stating that suspects may be less trusting of their
memory due to young age, mental illness, intellectual disability, or a history of drug and alcohol
abuse).
94 See Lloyd, supra note 80, at 128.
9 See Morgan Cloud et al., Words Without Meaning: The Constitution, Confessions, and
Mentally Retarded Suspects, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 495, 499 (2002); Caroline Everington & Solomon
M. Fulero, Competence to Confess: Measuring Understanding and Suggestibility of Defendants
with Mental Retardation, 37 MENTAL RETARDATION 212, 212 (1999).
9 See Cloud et al., supra note 95, at 514.
9 See State v. Simmons, 599 S.E.2d 448, 449 (S.C. 2004).
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of evidence: (1) DNA test results which, in the prosecution's view,
conclusively identified Simmons as the perpetrator; and (2) Simmons'
multiple confessions. 98 Despite a vigorous defense, Simmons was
found guilty and sentenced to death. 99 We became involved in the
case after his convictions and death sentence were affirmed on direct
appeal, and after Atkins established the Eighth Amendment ban
against executing persons with intellectual disability. 100 Proving
that Kenneth fell into the protected category was a (relatively)
straightforward proposition. The State would not concede that he
was a person with intellectual disability, relying on the irrelevant
fact that he had been a "star" football player in high school.10 1 One
of our former clinic students assumed Kenneth's representation and
began to scrutinize the evidence supporting his conviction.
* In the first three (of six) interrogations, Kenneth "confessed" to
knowing about or participating in three other murders-all three of
which were later determined to be fictional. In interrogation four,
law enforcement was able to get him to admit that he knew
something about some other people having committed Boyd's
murder, although his account was bizarre, incoherent, and conflicted
with known facts about the crime.102 In the fifth interrogation,
Kenneth confessed to the Boyd murder-again with several factual
inaccuracies, albeit fewer than in his previous statement. During the
sixth interrogation, he was shown a written transcript of the "recap"
from his statement in the fifth interview and asked to agree that it
was correct, which he did despite the fact that he only reads and
writes at a third-grade level.103
Experts agreed that Kenneth's confessions bore all the hallmark
features of false confessions made by a person with intellectual
disability, but that still left the DNA. 104 A re-analysis of that
evidence by competent, neutral experts uncovered that the state's
DNA experts testified at trial that certain tests showed a conclusive.
"match" to Simmons when, in fact, the DNA results they obtained
from those tests matched only the victim's own DNA and did not
98 See id. at 450.
99 See id. at 449.
1oo Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
101 See Blume, supra note 11, at 12.
102 See Brief of the Arc of S.C. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 5, 14, Simmons
v. State, 788 S.E.2d 220 (S.C. 2016) (No. 05-CP-1368) [hereinafter Amicus Brief of the Arc of
S.C.].
103 See id. at 12-13.
104 See id. at 3-5, 12.
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match Simmons' at all.105 It was also revealed that the prosecution's'
forensic experts withheld evidence that directly contradicted their
trial assertions that the evidence contained a testable mixture of
DNA (rather than simply the victim's own, single-source sample).106
Finally, the State had suppressed test results showing that the
evidence contained only female DNA.07 Simmons' conviction was
ultimately vacated given the erosion of the two pillars of the
prosecution's case against him-just one of many other examples of
individuals with intellectual disability who have falsely confessed.10s
B. Difficulties Assisting Counsel
Most of our clients with intellectual disability over the years,
regardless of whether they were innocent or guilty, provided minimal
assistance to the defense effort. Deficits in memory, language, and
the ability to understand abstract legal concepts and ideas can make
it difficult to maintain focus and assist counsel. 109 While there may
be some exceptions (a caveat required because persons with
intellectual disability have strengths and weaknesses), our
experience has been that the cognitive limitations present in all
persons with intellectual disability make it difficult for them to
remember events accurately and provide information to the defense
team in a coherent manner.110 This makes investigation more
difficult and limits their ability to testify at trial.
Ringo Pearson, for example, had no real sense of time, and when
105 See Simmons v. State, 788 S.E.2d 220, 223-24 (S.C. 2016); Brief of the Innocence Network
as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 18, Simmons v. State, 788 S.E.2d 220 (S.C. 2016)
(No. 05-CP-18-1368) [hereinafter Amicus Brief of the Innocence Network]; Blume, supra note
11, at 12.
106 See Simmons, 788 S.E.2d at 223, 224 n.10; Amicus Brief of the Innocence Network, supra
note 105, at 15-18.
107 See Amicus Brief of the Innocence Network, supra note 105, at 18.
108 See Mandy Medlock, Former Death-Sentenced Inmate Wins a New Trial, JUST. 360 (July
31, 2017), https://justice360sc.org/2017/former-death-sentenced-inmate-wins-new-triall; see,
e.g., Paul T. Hourihan, Earl Washington's Confession: Mental Retardation and the Law of
Confessions, 81 VA. L. REV. 1471, 1471, 1503 (1995); Robert Perske, The Battle for Richard
Lapointe's Life, 34 MENTAL RETARDATION 323, 323-25 (1996).
109 See Marla Sandys et al., Taking Account of the "Diminished Capacities of the Retarded.
Are Capital Jurors Up to the Task?, 57 DEPAUL L. REV. 679, 684 (2008).
110 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 31, at 28 ("[P]eople with mental retardation
typically find it difficult to recall information that might help an attorney-in part because of
problems with memory, in part because they are not able to conceptualize what information
might be helpful. The trial lawyer for Johnny Paul Penry, for example, told Human Rights
Watch that Penry was unable to answer open-ended questions about his activities on the day
of the murder for which he was ultimately convicted. If asked leading questions, Penry would
provide inconsistent yes or no responses depending on how the questions were formulated and
what Penry apparently believed his attorney wanted him to say.").
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pressed for when something happened, he would frequently just pick
a day or time at random. Kenneth Simmons' automatic response was
"I don't know" or "I don't remember." Eddie Elmore was significantly
better at relaying historical events accurately than either Ringo or
Kenneth, but even he, when pressed by law enforcement (and later
by his own attorneys) as to whether he committed the crime,
eventually said that if he did: "he did not remember doing it."n'
While perceived by the police, jurors, and judges as an admission,
this was in fact simply the truthful response of someone with
compromised intellectual functioning. 112
. We were not able to empirically study the rates at which people
with intellectual disability have difficulty assisting counsel because.
it is not measured in available data and can be difficult to uncover
from reading court filings and news aiticles. Th'e extent to which the
intellectual disability interferes in assisting counsel doubtless
manifests in different ways based on the individual's skills and
weaknesses.1 13 This is an important area for future research.
The NRE data does suggest that attorney errors are similarly high
for people not identified as having a mental disability and people
identified as having intellectual disability.114 As Table 5 reflects,
approximately 25% of all exonerees and 30% of exonerees with
intellectual disability had an inadequate legal defense. 115 Despite the
similar rates of inadequate legal defenses, the consequences are
likely to be more serious for people with intellectual disability as they
are likely to have more challenges navigating the legal system. 1
6
However, these numbers capture only the cases where lawyers
misbehaved but not the cases where a more competent client would
have been able to muster information that a lawyer could then have
used to better defend the client.
-u See Blume, supra note 11, at 11.
"2 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 31, at 11; Blume, supra note 11, at 11.
us See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 31, at 28; Sandys et al., supra note 109, at 684.
114 See infra Table 5.
115 See id.
116 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 31, at 21.
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Table 5. Exonerations by Defense and Prosecution Error
Total Any Mental Disability Intellectual Disability
N= 2358 n = 146 n = 101
Inadequate Legal Defense 594 (25%) 47 (32%) 30 (30%)
Official Misconduct 1254 (53%) 97 (66%) 72 (71%)
Note: Data from National Registry of Exonerations. The intellectual disability variable was
created by the authors based on information from the NRE.
Interestingly, rates of official misconduct (including misbehavior
by police, prosecutors, or other government officials) were somewhat
higher where exonerees were individuals with intellectual disability
(71% of people with intellectual disability and 53% of all
exonerees).1 17 This may be related to the fact that individuals with
intellectual disability are more susceptible to exploitation, or less
likely to assist counsel in uncovering misconduct.118
C. Inappropriate Demeanor
The final factor Atkins noted as increasing the risk of wrongful
conviction for people with intellectual disability is that "their
demeanor may create an unwarranted impression of lack of remorse
for their crimes."lO
This factor is not measured in the NRE data and is difficult to find
in court filings but extrapolating from our experience, likely is
common. In fact, the "demeanor" issue haunts all capital clients. 120
As, the Capital Jury Project interviews revealed, jurors scrutinize
capital defendants extremely closely, and often conclude that they
lack remorse and even basic human feelings.1 2 1 This is at least in
part attributable to the fact that the defendant (often on instruction
from counsel) sits in the courtroom staring down, straight-ahead or
at the walls, rarely reacting when, for example, crime scene photos
are displayed to the jury or gut-wrenching victim-impact testimony
n1 See supra Table 5.
u1s See infra Part II.D.
119 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320-21 (2002).
120 See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg et al., But Was He Sorry? The Role of Remorse in Capital
Sentencing, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1599, 1600 (1998).
121 See id. at 1619; Scott E. Sundby, The Capital Jury and Absolution: The Intersection of
Trial Strategy, Remorse, and the Death Penalty, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1557, 1568-69 (1998)
("[A]n astonishing 85% of death jurors believed that the defendant did not so much as 'even
pretend' to be sorry .... .").
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is presented. 122 Too much display of emotion, however, can also harm
the defendant with jurors viewing it as faking remorse. 123
This "damned if you do, damned if you don't" situation, which is
very tricky in any capital case, is exacerbated in cases involving
persons with intellectual disability. 124 Unfortunately, capital jurors
do not judge remorse differently even when they believe the
defendant has intellectual disability.1 25 While most persons with
intellectual disability are deemed competent to stand trial,1 26 absent
significant (and often unrealistic) accommodations, they rarely are
truly able to understand the proceedings. During hours of testimony,
defendants with intellectual disability often have little to no idea
what the witnesses are talking about (e.g., during the testimony of
forensic examiners) and thus are-understandably-bored. 127 For
example, Lane Doil asked the judge for crayons so he could color
pictures during his trial for murder.128 It is common for individuals
with intellectual disability to try to conceal their disability and
pretend they understand, so when they misread the situation they
may display inappropriate emotional reactions.1 29 Even if they are
following the testimony, some people with intellectual disability can
struggle with nonverbal behaviors, such as eye contact. 1
30 In
addition, people with intellectual disability may display different
symptoms of grief and may have different concepts of death.1 31
122 See Eisenberg et al., supra note 120, at 1617 ("One thing a defendant should not do if he
hopes to convince jurors of his remorse is look bored.").
123 See Sundby, supra note 121, at 1569.
124 See id. at 1619.
125 See id. ("[Jiurors' belief that the defendant is 'mentally defective oi retarded' or
'emotionally unstable or disturbed' bore little relation to their sense that he was remorseful.").
126 A defendant is deemed competent to stand trial if he (or she) has a rational and factual
understanding of the charges and the rational and factual ability to consult with counsel. See
Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960). This is a very "low bar," and persons with
severe mental illness and mild to moderate intellectual disability are found competent to stand
trial every day. See, e.g., Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants with
Mental Retardation to Participate in Their Own Defense, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 419,
421 (1990).
127 See TEX. DEFENDER SERV., A STATE OF DENIAL: TEXAS JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY
68 (2000), http://texasdefender.org/wp-content/uploads/TDS-2001-StateOfmenial-Ch5.pdf.
128 See id. at 71.
129 .See Sandys et al., supra note 109, at 684, 692 ("When asked if there 'is anything about
the case that continues to stick in mind or that you keep thinking about,' the juror responded,
'[The defendant] was laughing when [the jury] handed down [the] sentence. When that
happened, hair stood up on the back of my neck, and I knew the man just wasn't right."').
130 See Erik W. Carter et al., Factors Influencing Social Interaction Among High School
Students with Intellectual Disabilities and Their General Education Peers, 110 AM. J. MENTAL
RETARDATION 366, 375 (2005).
131 See P. Dodd et al., A Study of Complicated Grief Symptoms in People with Intellectual
Disabilities, 52 J. INTELL. DISABILITY RES. 415, 423 (2008).
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Stereotype can also preclude jurors from believing that a defendant
has intellectual disability.1 3 2 The general public has limited exposure
to individuals with intellectual disability, 133 and people tend to expect
them to have vastly lower abilities than are typical. 134 Even experts
can misjudge the demeanor of people with intellectual disability.135
During Ringo Pearson's Atkins' hearing, the state's examiner
testified that one reason he did not believe Pearson was a person with
intellectual disability was his observation of Pearson interacting
"normally" with two of the authors during the testimony of a
prosecution witness. 136 On cross-examination, he was asked if it
would "inform" his opinion to know what Pearson was saying to
counsel. 137 When he admitted (as he had to) that it might, he was
informed that Pearson was advising counsel that he needed to use
the restroom.138 Jurors too are often skeptical of defendants asserted
to have intellectual disability, and when those defendants display
deficits, jurors tend to believe the defendants are faking it.139
D. Exploitation by Codefendants and Jailhouse Informants
Finally, we note-though Atkins did not-that defendants with
intellectual disability are more vulnerable to being exploited by
codefendants and jailhouse informants.140 The same vulnerability to
suggestion and compliance with authority that makes persons with
intellectual disability more likely to confess falsely to crimes they did
not commit also makes many such persons more likely to overstate
their role in crimes in which they had some part, particularly if a
trusted "friend" is urging such an account of the crime.1 41 Likewise,
132 See Sandys et al., supra note 109, at 684.
133 See Katrina Scior, Public Awareness, Attitudes and Beliefs Regarding Intellectual
Disability: A Systematic Review, 32 RES. DEVELOPMENTAL DISABRITIES 2164, 2166 (2011).
134 See Marcus T. Boccaccini et al., Jury Pool Members'Beliefs About the Relation Between
Potential Impairments in Functioning and Mental Retardation: Implications for Atkins-Type
Cases, 34 LAW & PSYCH. REV. 1, 17 (2010); Sandys et al., supra note 109, at 693 ("[A] juror from
Alabama recalled that the 'defense said defendant was mentally defective but defendant spoke
well trying to save his skin."').
135 See Blume, supra note 11, at 11.
136 See id.
137 See id.
138 See id. Pearson tugged on one of our sleeves on two occasions during the testimony. On
the first occasion he said: "Mr. John, I have to pee." On the second occasion, he said: "Mr. John
I have to pee real bad." Id.
139 See Sandys et al., supra note 109, at 693 ("Perhaps more than any other reaction, thejurors reported disbelief about the actual [intellectual disability] diagnosis.").
140 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318-21 (2002); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note
31, at 15.
141 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 31, at 15 ("People with mental retardation can
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when it comes time to make a deal, the person of normal intellectual
ability is likely to be the one to be offered, and accept, a plea offer
from the prosecution that reduces the charges in exchange for
testimony, in part because their testimony is likely to be more
persuasive, and hence more valuable to the prosecution. 142
Interestingly, although the Court did not note this vulnerability to
exploitation, it was present in Atkins. 143 Daryl Atkins' co-defendant,
William Jones, provided law enforcement with a more coherent (but
as it turned out, coached) narrative of the offense, while Atkins'
account, due to his intellectual disability, was more halting, jumbled
and difficult to follow. 1 4 4 With no evidence indicating who was the
"trigger-man," the prosecution elected to offer Jones a life sentence to
testify against Atkins, an offer Jones gladly accepted. 45 It was
ultimately revealed that the prosecution failed to disclose the
manicuring of Jones' testimony and Atkins was removed from death
row because of the possibility that he was not 'the shooter (a fact
required under Virginia law for death eligibility).1 4 6
Relatedly, a defendant with intellectual disability is often an easy
target for a jailhouse informant (aka "snitch") once he is incarcerated;
he is more likely than other defendants to be willing to talk to a
snitch, more likely to say something incriminating (whether true or
not), and less likely to be able to muster convincing evidence that the
snitch made up the confession he claimed to have heard (whether he
did or not).14 7
Data from the NRE reflect that jailhouse informants are similarly
represented in exonerations of people with intellectual disability and.
people with no evidence of a mental disability; informants play a role
in 7% of all exoneration cases and 10% of exonerations of people with
intellectual disability.1 48 Exonerations of people witr intellectual
disability .were only slightly more likely to include perjury or
unsworn false accusations by individuals other than the exoneree
(58% of all exonerations and 62% of exonerations of people with
intellectual disability).1 49 Thus people with intellectual disability are
fall prey when people with greater intelligence decide to take advantage of them, and they
become the unwitting tools of others.").
142 See id. at 16.
143 See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 307.
144 TASSt & BLUME,.supra note 57, at 37-38, 53.
145 See id. at 37.
146 See id. at 53-54.
147 See Blume et al., supra note 71, at 957-58.
us See infra Table 6.
149 See id.
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only slightly more likely to be exploited by jailhouse informants or
other false witnesses than are persons without intellectual disability,
but this still is a leading, cause of wrongful conviction for all
defendants.15o
Table 6. Exonerations by Other Informants
Total Any Mental Disability Intellectual Disability
N=2358 n=146 n =101
Perjury / False
Accusation 1370 (58%) 83 (57%) 63 (62%)
Jailhouse Informant 158 (7%) 14 (10%) 10 (10%)
Co-Defendant Confessed 306 (13%) 34 (23%) 28 (28%)
Group Exonerated 476 (20%) 30 (21%) 23 (23%)
Note: Data from National Registry of Exonerations. The intellectual disability variable was
created by the authors based on information from the NRE.
The case of our former client with intellectual disability, Eddie
Elmore, is paradigmatic. James Gilliam took the stand at Elmore's
three trials and told the jury that, while they were in jail prior to
Elmore's trial, Elmore admitted that he sexually assaulted and killed
the victim and then "cleaned up."15 1 Gilliam's testimony gave the
prosecution the clear admission of guilt that Elmore had failed to give
during lengthy police interrogation, and also conveniently explained
several forensic gaffes and gaps in the prosecution's case. 152 Gilliam
later recanted and testified in post-conviction proceedings that the
only thing Elmore said during their pre-trial confinement was that
he did not commit the crime. 153 His testimony, along with new
forensic analysis and evidence that effectively, in the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit's view, destroyed the
prosecution's case against Elmore, and led to his eventual release.15 4
But Gilliam's trial testimony contributed to Elmore's nearly thirty
years of imprisonment for a crime he did not commit.155
Henry McCollum's case provides another example. McCollum, a
nineteen-year-old boy with an IQ of fifty-one, was implicated in the
150 See id.
151 See Elmore v. Ozmint, 661 F.3d 783, 796, 820 (4th Cir. 2011).
152 See id. at 802-03, 821.
153 See id. at 820.
154 See id. at 873.
155 See id. at 785, 802.
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rape and murder of an eleven-year-old girl.156 A teenager told police
about a school rumor that McCollum was involved because he looked
weird.15 7 This tip caused police to interrogate McCollum for over four
hours, eventually causing him to confess and implicate four other
people including his fifteen-year-old brother Leon.15 8 Leon, who had
an IQ of forty-nine, also confessed and implicated the others. 159
During the trial, L.P. Sinclair, a seventeen-year-old boy, testified that
both brothers had confessed to him. 160 On cross-examination, he
admitted that police had interviewed him three times before he
implicated them. 161 Later both men were exonerated by DNA
evidence that implicated a man who was convicted of a similar
crime. 16 2
CONCLUSION
This essay builds on our prior work on intellectual disability
generally and intellectual disability and innocence in particular. It
provides additional quantitative and qualitative support for the
Supreme Court's decision in Atkins; the Court was right that the
enhanced risk of wrongful conviction and execution was an additional
reason that persons with intellectual disability should be exempt
from the executioner's reach. 163
Beyond providing empirical support for Atkins, the available data
raise the disturbing likelihood that wrongful convictions of the
persons with intellectual disability are not rare. Post-conviction
investigation sufficient to demonstrate innocence is much less likely
in noncapital cases than in capital cases, regardless of the
intellectual ability of the defendant.1 64  Certainly avoiding the
,execution of innocents is important, but leaving intellectually
disabled innocents to languish in prison is also wrong. Thus, not only
should Atkins be retained, but courts should be vigilant to the
possibility of innocence in noncapital cases where there is evidence
that the defendant is a person with intellectual disability.
156 See Maurice Possley, Henry McCollurm, NAT'L REGISTRY EXONERATIONS (Sept. 2, 2014),
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exonerationfPages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=44
9 2 ; Order for
Relief at 1, State v. McCollum, 433 S.E.2d 144 (N.C. 1993) (No. 83 CRS 11506-07).
157 See Possley, supra note 156. -
158 See id.
159 See id.
16o See id.
161 See id.
162 See id.; Order for Relief, supra note 156, at 3.
163 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
164 See Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 61 (2008).
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APPENDIX165
I. MICHAEL ANDERSON (LOUISIANA)
Anderson was charged with a quintuple capital murder. He
presented an Atkins claim that included IQ scores of 67, 79, 64, and
71, and a finding that he scored more than two standard deviations
below the mean on an academic achievement measure. Anderson's
Atkins claim failed and he was sentenced to death, but his conviction
was overturned due to prosecutor misconduct.
Anderson maintained his innocence and claimed the crimes were
committed by Telly Hankton. Federal prosecutors said in court and
in the press that they believed the crimes were committed by
Hankton and not Anderson. Anderson eventually entered an Alford
plea to manslaughter.
II. RICHARD BAYS (OHIO)
Bays was sentenced to death for a murder in 1995. His conviction
was based largely on his confession that was fed to him by police and
microscopic hair analysis that has been discredited. Experts testified
that Bays meets the criteria for ID. Bays' has I.Q. scores of 74 and
71. He was in special education programs and is unable to hold a job.
On appeal he has raised intellectual disability and Atkins claims
that are still pending. Hair on the victim and a fingerprint at the
crime scene did not belong to the victim or Bays. Bays has denied
involvement multiple times and said he only confessed after being
165 To find cases that are not necessarily ascertainable through the exoneration lists or other
search engines, we asked attorneys for cases where a death sentenced inmate (or a person
facing the death penalty at trial) was both determined to be a person with intellectual disability
under Atkins and either subsequently exonerated, prevailed on a claim and the case was
resolved due to doubts about guilt (i.e., through an Alford plea), or whose case is currently
pending in the state or federal appellate process and there is a substantial question of
innocence. Through these contacts, we learned of 45 cases. We excluded cases already reported
in previous research and the NRE database. See supra Part I. Then we examined the evidence
of intellectual disability and innocence by reviewing reported judicial decisions, searching local
newspaper archives, and asking attorneys for court filings. In this Appendix, we include cases
where (1) there is documented evidence consistent with intellectual disability (e.g. IQ scores
below 70 and deficits in adaptive functioning) even if the court did not find that the person has
intellectual disability and (2) there is evidence in support of innocence or evidence discrediting
the State's main evidence of guilt. The complete database is on file with authors.
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told that if he didn't confess he would be executed.
III. MICHAEL BIES (OHIO)
Michael Bies and Darryl Gumm were convicted and sentenced to
death in 1992. Their convictions and sentences were overturned
when they were found to be mentally disabled and a federal judge
ruled they didn't receive fair trials. Bies has a full-scale IQ of 60 and
adaptive skills comparable to those of a ten-year old, and he is
functionally illiterate.
There was no physical evidence against Bies or Gumm. They were
found guilty based primarily on an unrecorded confession following a
prolonged, highly suggestive interrogation. The State witheld
witness statements that undermined their theory of the crime. Bies
accepted a plea to manslaughter and was sentenced to 35 years.
IV. ANDRE BURTON (CALIFORNIA)
Burton was convicted of robbery and murder and sentenced to
death in 1983. He has Fetal Alcohol Syndrome and temporal and
frontal lobe damage. In addition, neuropsychological testing found
cognitive and brain dysfunction and his IQ scores are in the range of
intellectual disability.
On appeal, Burton presented an alibi witness and evidence of
mistaken eyewitness identification. Burton's former girlfriend stated
that he was home with her and two other people at the time of the
crime.. Witnesses' descriptions of the perpetrator was not close to the
race, age, or weight of Burton. Burton's conviction and death
sentence were overturned in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in
2016 because Burton was prevented from representing himself at
trial.
V. DARRYL GuMM (OHIO)
Along with Michael Bies, Darryl Gumm was convicted and
sentenced to death in 1992. Gumm has multiple IQ scores in the
range of intellectual disability. Gumm cannot read or write and is
functionally illiterate.
Gumm's shoes and palm prints did not match evidence from the
crime scene. The State relied on Gumm's confession after a lengthy
and suggestive interrogration. The State failed to disclose evidence
of another suspect who was seen near the the crime scene at the time
of the crime, confessed to multiple people, and had a palm print that
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was similar to the one from the crime scene. After Gumm's conviction
and death sentence were overturned, he entered a plea to voluntary
manslaughter and was sentenced to 35 years in prison.
VI. DANNY LEE HILL (OHIO)
Hill was convicted of murder and sentenced to death based largely
on his confession and bite mark evidence. Eighteen-year-old Hill's
confession was in response to multiple leading questions by police
(and he had no parent or lawyer present). After Atkins, Hill appealed
his death sentence and presented substantial evidence of intellectual
disability including numerous IQ scores in the range of intellectual
disability and school and court records indicating he is a person with
intellectual disability.
Hill also maintains his innocence and has appealed his conviction,
discrediting the expert's testimony regarding bitemark evidence. In
addition, Hill's pants had no trace of blood despite the crime scene
being very bloody. Hill's Atkins and innocence claims are still
pending in the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.
VII. JOSEPH JEAN (TEXAS)
Jean was convicted of murder and sentenced to death in Texas. His
conviction was largely based on inaccurate eyewitness testimony and
his confession, which was in response to multiple interrogations. He
has raised Atkins and innocence claims on appeal. His IQ score is 69,
he scored within the range of intellectual disability on an adaptive
functioning measure, and he attended special education. The
eyewitness testimony placing him at the scene of the crime was
discredited by red light camera footage. In addition, Jean's DNA did
not match a sample from the victim (or was at best inconclusive).
VIII. JESSE LEE JOHNSON (OREGON)
Johnson was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. On
appeal he has raised Atkins and innocence claims. He has IQ scores
of 72, 81, and 77 and is diagnosed with Fetal Alcohol Spectrum
Disorder. Throughout the trial, Johnson maintained his innocence
and rejected a plea offer. Johnson was excluded from DNA found at
the crime scene, which matched another man. The trial judge found
that two lead detectives on Mr. Johnson's case "both lied or
intentionally misrepresented critical facts in both their sworn
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testimony before the court and in sworn affidavits."
IX. FLOYD MAESTAS (UTAH)
Maestas was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. Maestas'
Atkins claim failed despite presenting two experts who testifed that
he was a person with intellectual disability. The court found that
Maestas failed to demonstrate a causal relationship between his
deficits in intellectual functioning and his deficits in adaptive
functioning, even though this is not required by the AAIDD or APA.
Maestas maintained his innocence and said he was framed. On
appeal, he presented evidence that the people who framed him
admitted it to witnesses and the DNA evidence used against him was
unreliable. Maestas lost his appeal in the Utah Supreme Court and
died on death row before these issues were resolved in Federal Court.
X. ROBERT NELSON (SOUTH CAROLINA)
Nelson was charged with murder after he confessed to being
present while several men robbed and killed the victims. Nelson, who
was a teenager at the time of the crime, said that one of the men held
a gun to his head during the crime. Fearing retaliation from the men
he implicated, Nelson later retracted his statement and gave a full
confession in which he claimed that he acted alone.
Initially, the State filed a notice to seek the death penalty, but
withdrew the notice after the South Carolina Department of
Disabilities and Special. Needs found Nelson was a person with
intellectual disability. Nelson reads at a fourth grade level, has an
IQ in the 60s, and scored in the lowest percentile in an adaptive
funcitoning measure.
* Nelson was found guilty and sentenced to 52 years' imprisonment.
Nelson appealed his conviction, claiming that his confession was
undermined by conflicting accounts and a detective admitting to.
suggesting details to Nelson during multiple interrogations. DNA
from the crime scene, including Victim's fingernail scrapings, did not
belong to Nelson. Ultimately, Nelson withdrew his appeal and
accepted a plea.
XI. JOHNNY RINGO PEARSON (SOUTH CAROLINA)
Pearson was charged with rape and murder in 1995. At an Atkins
hearing, Pearson presented IQ scores in the 60s and evidence that he
attended special education and was unable to advance beyond fifth
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grade in school. In addition, Pearson was unable to maintian
employment and an expert testified that his living skills were
equivalent to those of an eight-year-old. The judge ruled that
Pearson was a person with intellectual disaility and could not be
sentenced to death.
Pearson's confession did not match physical evidence nor the
prosecution's theory of the case. The other evidence against him,
snitch testimony and duct tape from the scene "matching" a role of
tape in his car, was also discredited. Pearson accepted an Alford plea
and was released from prison before he questioned this evidence at
trial.
XII. GEORGE PORTER (IDAHO)
Porter was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. During a
Post-Conviction Relief hearing, a clinical neuropsychologist testified
that Porter is intellectually deficient and has an IQ near 70.
Porter maintains his innocence and presented evidence that he was
excluded from DNA discovered on the weapon at the crime scene.
Porter accepted an Alford plea before a court ruled on his innocence
and Atkins claims. Porter, who had been on death row, was released
as a result of the plea.
XIII. KENNETH SIMMONS (SOUTH CAROLINA)
Simmons was convicted and sentenced to death in connection with
the rape and murder of an eighty-seven year old woman. Simmons'
death sentence was vacated when the PCR court found he was a
person with intellectual disability. Simmons was interrogated
multiple times and eventually "confessed" to the murder (and three
other murders which were determined to be fictional). DNA found at
the scene did not match Simmons. Simmons' conviction was
ultimately vacated.
XIV. MANUEL VELEZ (TEXAS)
Velez was convicted of the murder of his girlfriend's one-year-old
son and sentenced to death. Velez has an IQ of 65 and reads below
the second grade level in English and at the Kindergarten level in
Spanish. During a habeas hearing, Velez presented evidence that he
was not with the victim when he was injured, and it was the victim's
mother who inflicted the fatal injuries. Family members and
neighbors testified that they witnessed the victim's mother abuse and
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neglect him. Velez's conviction was overturned because he received
an inadequate defense. Ultimately, he entered a plea for failing to
report child abuse.
XV. RUSSELL WEINBERGER (PENNSYLVANIA)
Facing a possible death sentence, Weinberger plead guilty to
murder in 1985. He agreed to testify against his co-defendant, Felix
Rodriquez, who had previously confessed and implicated Weinberger.
Weinberger had an IQ between 60 and 65. He could not read or spell
and had been in special education. The real killer, Anthony
Sylvanus, was identified through a fingerprint database and made a
full confession in 2001, more than 20 years after the murder.
Weinberger and Rodriquez were released after serving 21 years in
prison.
XVI. COREY DEWAYNE WILLIAMS (LOUISIANA)
Williams was convicted of the murder of a man who was delivering
pizza. He was sentenced to death in 2000 based primarily on the
testimony of eyewitnesses and his own confession. Williams, who
was 16 at the time of the murder, had IQ scores of 68, 65, and 69. He
scored in the range of intellectual disability on an adaptive
functioning measure and was in special education starting at age 9.
Eyewitnesses initially said they saw several older men-and not
Williams-steal from the victim and that it could not have been
Williams who committed the murder. In addition, investigating
police officers did not believe Williams was the murderer untill he
confessed. Williams accepted and Alford plea and was released. As
part of his deal, Williams had to plead guilty to obstruction of justice
for his false confession.
'XVII. DAVID WOOD (TEXAS)
In 1992, Wood was convicted of the serial murders of six young
women based largely on the testimony of jailhouse informants.
Wood's Atkins claim was denied despite substantial evidence
including IQ scores of 64, 71, and 75. Wood failed first grade, third
grade, and ninth grade and eventually dropped out in ninth grade at
the age of 17. He also attended special education classes.
Police logs indicate that'Wood had no contact with the victims on
the days some of them disappeared. In addition, DNA from the crime
scene, including the victim's clothing, did not match Wood. A
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jailhouse informant received reward money ($26,000) and a
sentencing deal for testifying against Wood. Wood has been on death
row for 25 years and is still appealing his conviction.
XVIII. ROBERT YOUNG (CALIFORNIA)
Young, who was 20 at the time of the crimes, was convicted of the
murder of three men who were shot to death in separate incidents
over a three-week period in 1989. He was sentenced to death.
During the sentencing phase of his trial, an expert testified that
Young had an IQ of 75, the educational skills of a 9 year old, and
performed below the fourth grade level in a measure of academic
achievement. Young had learning and adjustment problems since
Kindergarten and dropped out of school in ninth grade.
On appeal, Young presented evidence that he was too injured on
the day of the crime to have committed the offense. In addition, he
presented evidence discrediting the witnesses who testified against
him. In 2015, Young's conviction was vacated because of juror
misconduct. The State did not retry him and dismissed the charges.
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